phenomenon, and nothing is more important for its future than the question of whether the Old Continent will be able to solve this growing demographic crisis, and if so, how. This project will examine this topical issue and will try to explain the main problems related to the subject, and present a possible future scenario that addresses it.
In the near to midterm, the most promising solution to mitigate population decline seems to be immigration, supported by a concerted effort to make the European Union a more attractive destination for immigrants through a fair and proactive integration policy. The migration context in Europe has changed significantly over the last few decades and many Member States have converted from countries of emigration to countries of immigration. Immigration alone will not resolve Europe's demographic and economic problems, but it may help mitigate the phenomenon. If European citizens perceive immigration as an opportunity to be seized, rather than a burden to be shouldered and a threat to their security, culture and nations, Europe will have a greater chance of maintaining its economic power and its relative geopolitical status.
WHAT ROLE CAN IMMIGRATION PLAY IN SHAPING EUROPE'S FUTURE?
Not so long ago, worried about the rising global population, Paul Ehrlich wrote apocalyptically in his 1968 worldwide bestseller, The Population Bomb, "In the 1970s and 1980s hundreds of millions of people will starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now. At this late date, nothing can prevent a substantial increase in the world death rate." Fortunately, Ehrlich was not a good clairvoyant and his predicted holocaust, which assumed that the 1960s global baby boom would continue, didn't happen. Instead, the global growth rate dropped from 2 percent in the mid-1960s to roughly half that today, with many countries no longer producing enough babies to avoid falling populations.
1 Among these countries, European nations are experiencing the most alarming and clear decline due to low fertility rates and rising longevity. As the combination of these two factors is set to have drastic consequences in the long term, nothing is more determinant for Europe's future than the question of whether the Old Continent will be able to solve this acute demographic problem, and if so, how. This project will examine this topical issue through the lens of critical thinking, explain the main problems related to the subject, and propose policy options.
Europeans should tackle this strategic issue without further procrastination because if urgent measures are not taken, their aging societies will create severe problems for their social and economic systems, undermining economic competitiveness and causing a decrease in Europe's power and influence. Numerous initiatives are under examination. The European Commission (EC) has already provided interesting responses to this crisis, inviting the European countries to harmonize their efforts and policies and offering, through a Communitarian Communication presented in 2006, a reference framework to help Member States develop their specific policies, the success of which will be in the interest of the European Union as a whole. 2 Among the initiatives, and not only from a symbolic point of view, is the EC plan to designate 2012 as the European Year on Active Ageing. Its goal is to promote better participation of aged people in society, -which includes the recognition that people, as they age, should enjoy active participation in the economic, social, cultural and political life of their societies as a main development objective‖. 3 Despite the numerous initiatives and the different fields of possible action, in the short-medium period, the most prompt and promising answer seems to be immigration, supported by a concerted effort to make the European Union (EU) a more attractive destination for immigrants including a fair and proactive integration policy. Immigration alone will not resolve Europe's demography problems, partially because its volume and its characteristics cannot be easily manipulated by governments. Also, immigration does not address the alarming problem of low birth rate. But a more substantial and legal flow of immigrants and a common integration policy may help mitigate the demographic crisis. Certainly, more immigrants could also mean more social, security, and economical problems and both European authorities and communities will face new challenges in managing relations with a growing Muslim population. But, if the European citizens, upon becoming aware of the steady and negative trend, are able to perceive immigration as an opportunity to be seized, rather than a burden to be shouldered and a threat to their culture and Nations, Europe will be able to harness the benefits that immigration can trigger and will have a greater chance of maintaining its economic power and its relative geopolitical status. If they fail to do so, immigration could harm Member States' long-term social and economic prospects or create dangerous social divisions.
The Aging Population Phenomenon
The total population of the 27 EU Member States grew from 404 million in 1960 to around 497.8 million in 2009; of these, almost 32 million were foreigners, accounting for 6.4% of the total. 4 In addition to this and according to a European Commission's assessment, about eight million illegal immigrants are also living in the EU. 5 In this context, it is necessary to highlight that immigration is the real basis of this increase; in fact, 82% of the EU population growth between 2000 and 2008 is the result of immigration, while the natural increase remains very low ( Figure 1 ). 6 By comparison, in the U.S.A. only one-third of current population growth is estimated to be caused by net immigration. The latest UN projections suggest that the pace at which the world's population is expanding will slow in the coming decades, even though the total number of inhabitants is projected to reach more than 9 billion by 2050. This relative stagnation will be particularly evident for developed economies (especially Europe), whose inhabitants are expected to reach a peak around 2035, followed by a slow decline until 2050. In contrast, we can observe expectations of 27 percent growth for the United States and In this changing context, aging society represents a major demographic challenge for a wide range of developed world economies. Western Europe will be hit particularly hard by this phenomenon and the median age of the total population is likely to increase in all its countries. Unfortunately, this is not a transitory wave like the baby boom that many nations went through in the 1950s, but it is a major demographic shift with no precedent in recent history. 8 This is due to the combined effect of the existing age structure of the population, a growing number of people who are living longer, and persistently low fertility. In other words, the Old Continent combines the extremes of very high longevity and very low fertility.
Thanks to an excellent quality of life, more than adequate quality of the environment and easy access to health care, the longevity rate in Europe is currently 75 years for men and 82 for women. The existing fertility rate is incredibly low and stands at 1.4, a value which is beneath the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. 9 This is because, after a period of stable marriages with many children (the baby boom in the 1950s is the best example), there was a shift throughout many European countries toward fewer marriages, fewer children, and much higher divorce rates. Moreover, women's changing social and economic expectations as well as the wish to maintain a high standard of living have led to better education and increased their labor force participation. Finally, difficulties to reconcile professional and family life delayed their age of first marriage and childbirth. As a result, under the current circumstances, throughout the European countries the economy may stagnate or even decline, employees may become less adaptable and mobile, innovation and investment may fall, and the budget deficits will balloon as the elderly population will be entitled to social contributions and pensions, and governments will be asked to provide appropriate assistance, build new and suitable infrastructure and guarantee greater health care support. Furthermore, an older society will become more conservative and older voters will have more political power.
Consequently, for political leaders it will be more difficult to manage this new gerontocracy and justify welfare cuts. Likewise, they may feel forced to safeguard oldage interests and programs that are economically unsustainable in the long term.
In the developed world, the United States is the only Western country whose population ranking will remain unchanged and whose aggregate economic size will keep pace with that of the other important world economies. 14 On the economic front, specifically, at the moment the main governmental initiatives to mitigate the negative impact of this phenomenon focus on the reduction of the projected cost of old-age benefits (pensions and health care) 15 , increasing retirement savings by introducing new and innovative solutions, the raising of the eligibility ages for public pensions, and increasing opportunities for more young people to work. On the other hand, it is evident that -working conditions and pension systems should be adapted to create a labor market for 50-70 year-olds by making recruitment and employment of older workers easier and more attractive‖. 16 Moving to the demographic field, the policy actions are equally decisive, especially in an attempt to increase the birthrate. Among the numerous initiatives, policies that help parents balance jobs and children are the linchpin of any strategy supporting fertility. To encourage families to have more children, some European countries are introducing more flexible career patterns that allow both women and men to move in and out of employment to accommodate the different cycles of family life. In addition to this, they also reward families for having more children, for example by building prenatal incentives, and increasing the per capita amount of cash payments with the number of children that families have, or reducing taxes. Furthermore, as young families are having a harder time getting established in the labor market, and are finding that affordable housing, child care and other supports are not easily accessible. Many
European governments have introduced interesting measures like mortgage housing credits, income security programs that provide benefits to support the extra costs associated with raising children, and stronger social service and community infrastructures. All these initiatives and policies are starting to show some results, but
are not easily sustainable in the long term, especially because they reduce productivity, exposing European companies to unacceptable risks.
Nevertheless, while there are evident margins to increase labor force participation, notably of women and older workers, it can be expected that within about ten years, the decline of the working-age population will be such -notably due to the retirement of the baby-boomers -that rising employment rates will no longer be sufficient to compensate for this decline. Thus, in the short-medium term, the most likely answer and more useful and effective tool to support the labor market, sustain the European economies, as well as to replace below-replacement fertility rates, seems to be immigration. But immigration is not only tightly connected to the challenges of demographic change and economic growth, but also to the welfare-state reform and the building of a common social and political system. Both academic observers and
European citizens are increasingly convinced that Europe's future will largely turn on how it will be able to admit and integrate immigrants. They also recognize that European countries are asked to reconcile protection of national borders and cultural identity with the need to relieve growing demographic and labor market imbalances.
And this is a very demanding task. However, Europe can maintain its size and dynamism only by -importing‖ non-Europeans. Whether the Old Continent will successfully succeed in accommodating immigrants will depend on whether natives and newcomers perceive Europe as a prosperous civilization or a declining one.
History Of Migration Into The EU
Europe was from the early 1800s until the 1950s a continent of emigration 17 and a large number of emigrants left the native lands to reach South and North America, Australia or South Africa. During the 1960s, many European nations still had a negative migration balance. It was only after this that the Old Continent decreased from 400,000 emigrants per annum in the early 1950s to less than 100,000 per annum in the early 1990s and became a land of immigration. Part of this drop can be explained by the resurgence of migration within Europe. 18 In fact, in 2009, 37 percent of the foreign citizens living in the EU27 were citizens of another EU27 Member state. 19 To better understand immigration in Europe, it is necessary to consider the different waves, from the end of World War II until now, that characterized this impressive phenomenon, whose roots were more about economics than politics. In fact, immigration was particularly influenced by economic conditions in both the native country and host land, leading in most cases to the movement from less developed to more economically advanced regions. The contribution provided by immigrants was a determining factor in reviving the postwar economies of Western Europe.
The first wave started during the early postwar period, gathered pace through the 1950s, reached its zenith during the 1960s, and faded in the 1970s. This latest period is largely due to the first Arab oil embargo and the subsequent economic downturn which produced unemployment, and motivated governments to restrict severely the immigration of foreign workers. This initial phase was characterized by the mass movement of workers from the less developed states of the Mediterranean, Eastern
Europe and specific areas from outside (because of colonial links) to the major countries of Western Europe. 20 In the same period, some countries (for instance Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) lost a -substantial number of their citizens emigrating for economic reasons overseas, as well as to other European countries.‖
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The main characteristic of this first wave of migration was a huge need for manpower:
this was the key demand factor which saw migrants recruited to work in industry and other sectors where there was a shortage of indigenous workers. In particular, there were jobs which were undesirable by the native labor force, for instance in heavy industry, big factories and construction.
Although some scholars underline the costs related to this wave, specifically the circumstance that the abundant availability of foreign workers discouraged Western
European industry from introducing capital-intensive production methods, most of them agree that the economic impact was beneficial because the continuous supply of foreign labor was determinant to the success of the advanced industrial European economies.
Another essential feature of this first wave is that it largely started and continued in an -apolitical context‖. 22 Not only European public opinion was ignorant of the details and objectives of state immigration, but immigration policy was not an electoral issue and the result was a serious lack of public debate over the direction of that policy.
Under those circumstances, central governments encouraged or tolerated the immigration without first having a democratic discussion with their fellow citizens. Driven by such concerns and often unable to regulate the immigration process as well as to manage the domestic social and political fallout they precipitate, European governments sometimes preferred to present the mass immigrant settlement as a danger to public order, domestic and labor market stability, and cultural identity. In some circumstances, both central and local political representatives simply rode the wave of popular discontent and protest. In other cases, this attitude favored the surge of antiimmigrant movements and groups whose rhetoric can influence popular perception of threat and exercise political influence under very specific circumstances. Fortunately, the majority of these groups are on the fringe of societies and political parties, and most European governments are immune to their political pressures. 33 The Current Situation
Between the end of the last century and the beginning of the new one, the improving economic conditions within Europe, a more flexible labor market and some significant initiatives introduced by the EC in order to better regulate the immigration and facilitate the integration of foreign citizens, had made the Old Continent an even more attractive region for immigrants.
As reported above, on January 2009, almost 32 million foreign citizens lived in the EU27 Member States, alias 6.4 percent of the total EU27 population. Among these, 11.9 million were citizens of another EU27 Member State. The largest groups were from Romania (2.0 million or 6 percent of the total number of foreign citizens in the EU27),
and Poland (1.5 million or 5 percent).The remaining 19.9 million were non-EU citizens, specifically from Asia (4.0 million), Africa (4.9 million), the American Continent (3.3 million), and other European countries (7.2 million). Among these foreigners, the largest groups were from Turkey (2.4 million or 8 percent of the total number of foreign citizens in the EU27), Morocco (1.8 million or 6 percent) and Albania (1.0 million or 3 percent). 34 In particular, while the flow from Asia and Eastern Europe seemed to slow down, -the number of African migrants attempting to enter Europe has increased during the past few years‖, due to geographical proximity and colonial ties, but also to violence and poverty which are usually considered the most significant -push‖ factors in that Continent.
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-Push‖ factors constantly press people to leave their native countries because of difficult conditions of life (in particular, suppression of individual rights, violence, abject poverty, and lack of freedom). But, these impressive numbers show that also many -pull‖ factors continue to trigger mass immigration, drawing people to Europe to search for something safer and better. Even if the presence of immigrants is already important in terms of numbers, workers of different skill levels in general are still needed in Western European countries, and their demographic and economic contribution is not likely to decrease in the short-medium term. In fact, the demand for foreign workers has been and continues to be significant in advanced industrial economies because they provide a flexible, inexpensive, and malleable workforce. Moreover, the mass immigration is boosting population growth, thus attenuating the negative effects of demographic aging and population decline. Christian Democrats' parliamentary leader, said that foreigners who want to come and work in Germany must adopt German "Leitkultur" (leading culture) 38 , provoking the firm reaction of the moderate Chancellor Angela Merkel, who said that "Leitkultur" was not in her policy paper. 39 In addition to the lack of confidence in the positive role immigrants could play, we can observe that many old and new fears and some stereotypes typically associated with immigration increase native European citizens' distrust and often discourage the necessary political initiatives which could enable legal immigrants to permanently settle and actively participate in the host society through equality of opportunity and absence of discrimination. An evident example could be considered the rising resentment against Even worse, polls conducted in Germany and France found that second and third generation Muslims are less integrated into host societies than their parents or grandparents were. 47 The economic concern mainly comes from the risk of a growth in unemployment and an increase of the costs of state-provided social services. Supporters of restrictive immigration measures argue that high level of unemployment in some countries is only due to low salary, which does not attract skilled and well educated people. If the wages were higher, the rate of employment should increase. Regarding the welfare system, many European citizens stress the fact that in most Member States -social services are partly free for consumers, yet in reality, these services are paid for by the taxpayers.
Cheap-wage immigrants may bring some benefits for entrepreneurs but at the same time they burden the budget‖. 48 Finally, cultural justifications bring out the real possibility that differences of habits, customs, languages, and religion may dilute the historical European national societies. 49 In this last case, the situation is more complex and difficult to define because the Old Continent is going through an identity crisis. The identity of European
States is in fact not only obscured by supranational forces, primarily the EU and its political apparatus, but also -threatened‖ by the rise of internal regionalism, micronationalisms and separatist forces, and by a widespread -loss of national cultural and traditions in favor of an undefined multiculturalism‖. 50 -Europeans would like to exit from history, from la grande histoire, from the history that is written in letters of blood‖, wrote the French political writer Raymond Aron as early as the 1970s. border security by preventing irregular migrants from entering European countries. 52 Moreover, in all European countries we can observe a considerable gap between policy statements and commitments, on the one hand, and practice on the other. In sum, looking back over the past decades, it is clear that migration climbed successively higher on the European agenda and both European citizens and policymakers are more and more conscious that we need immigrants in order to secure our demographic and economic survival. There has certainly been some move forward in the development of a comprehensive, root causes approach within the European Union's external relations. Progress has, however, been much slower than expected.
Policy initiatives have to a large extent been event-driven and sensitive to national media and public opinion concerns regarding security issues. Consequently, more efforts have been made in facing near term issues (control of borders, illegal migration), than in drawing and implementing an effective integration policy for both newcomers and minorities already within Europe and on policies addressing the migration in cooperation with origin countries. In addition to this, only few European governments have introduced immigration policy that would specify levels of legal immigration, disregarding the European directives and maintaining strong national control over the policy process to the detriment of the European institutions' initiatives.
What To Do In The Future
In the last few years, whether Europeans like it or not, immigration to the Old Continent has increased so much that the EU has clearly overtaken the United States as the first destination in the world for immigrants. In the last two decades, 26 million migrants entered Europe, compared with 20 million in America. 62 In this framework, a growing number of Eastern European workers are helping Western European countries fill job vacancies and attenuate the shrinking and graying population phenomenon.
However, neither the significant intra-EU migration nor the general number of newcomers reported so far are sufficient to meet all of the labor demand, sensibly reducing the job vacancy rate (percentage of posts that are vacant) 63 and, at the same time, to invert the demographic -negative momentum‖. Thus, the EU should further  nationality and civic citizenship: the long-term legally resident immigrants should be offered the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the Member State in which they reside. In fact nationality is a means of facilitating integration and, at the same time, encourages a sense of belonging in national life.
At the same time, it is important not to forget the origin countries of immigrants.
Building mutually beneficial relationships with them could be very useful not only to properly address the migration flows, but also to better monitor concerns and expectations of foreign workers. In the past, international cooperation has not always been constructive, but nowadays it is essential. In particular, due to the growing flows of African immigrants, Europe should mainly focus on the African Continent and, besides the economic support and military interventions to stabilize the most critical areas, Brussels should revive the political dialogue, as a starting point to build more confidence and stimulate constructive cooperation on demographic issues and migration flows. 67 In perspective, Europe has not only the necessary experience and familiarity with this phenomenon, but also all the resources it needs to preserve the interests of the native European citizens, address the needs of immigrants, and harness the benefits that immigration can produce.
Conclusion
As the above-mentioned social, demographic and economic factors are likely to sharpen in the short term, and several indicators already show the gravity of the current situation, it is crystal clear that Europe is at a crossroads. It is time to pass from words to action, because the longer European institutions delay in tackling the issue, the bigger the difficulties they will have to face. Europeans can yield to the anti-immigration groups' threats, and to their fears and doubts, and slam the doors of immigration. Or they can overcome domestic concerns, anxieties and prejudice and open the doors, which seems the most rational and desirable solution. In fact, while attracting and accepting more immigrants might seem a hard choice today, EU cannot afford not to. 68 On the other hand, all the restrictive policies adopted in the past to reduce the phenomenon paradoxically resulted in increasing flows of illegal migrants and illicit traffic of human beings, making things worse. 69 Moreover, the European population is aging so fast that it would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future. What is happening demographically today, unless unexpected and catastrophic events occur, will have serious consequences for the future. Europe urgently needs young people to increase birth rates or face the attendant challenges and the risk of an undesirable decline. At the same time, all the European countries will increasingly rely on foreigners to fill labor shortages and generate -the tax base upon which the provision of future social welfare benefits will rest‖. 70 In fact, regardless of the initiative mentioned earlier, labor markets throughout the continent are coping with a deep shortage of skilled workers, considered essential to boost innovation, and unskilled workers to perform work for which few native citizens are available. -Even in times of economic weakness, many of these needs remainparticularly the need to attract and retain the most talented immigrants‖.
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If the EU assumes the necessary responsibilities and is able to alter the current course, negatively marked by the lack of a strong European plan and by disconnected national initiatives, the whole European economy will be in condition to maintain its firstrate world position and its geopolitical influence in a global stage.
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